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DICKYNSON LAL IIEVW
law remedy of damages, since delivery of the deed and payment would
be concurrent acts, and the defendant could thus be assured of perform.
ance by the plaintiff. Applying Cardozo's rule no "injustice or oppres
sion" would result to the defendant because the defendant is then re-
ceiving what was contracted for.
It is submitted that the court should rid itself of a rule such as this
-a rule without foundation-and that where one seeks specific enforce-
ment of a contract, "if there is no other good reason why it should not
be enforced except the want of mutuality of remedy, it will be so enforced","
John A. Cherry
THE TERMINATION OF SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
The Pennsylvania cases on this subject are comparatively few in
number, and the rules set down, while not inaccurate, are stated loosely.
This is accounted for by the fact that agreements of separation between
husband and wife are seldom used in Pennsylvania due to the fact that
the husband is compelled by statute to support his wife.
Before citing cases to illustrate the rules, it would be well to define
a separation agreement and point out the differences between it and a post-
nuptial property settlement. It is this latter form of contract which has
caused the courts much confusion in this regard. In general, the usual
separation agreement provides that the husband shall pay a certain amount
to the support of the wife during the separation, and the terms of such a
contract are, in the main, executory. On the other hand, a postnuptial
property settlement has to do with the dividing of property and property
interests between husband and wife. There is no question of the validity of
such an agreement of separation, both before and after the Act of June 8
1893,1 if made in contemplation of an immediate or an inevitable separa-2
tion.2 Neither is there any question of the validity of a postnuptial proper-
llI.amprey v. St. Paul & C. Ry. Co. et .al,. 89 Minn. 187, 94 N. W. 555.
21Married Women's Property Act, P. L. 344.
2Fennell's Estate, 207 Pa. 309; Rodenbaugh v. Rodenbaugb, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 419.
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ty settlement, if reasonable in its terms and if entered into by the wife
with a full knowledge of the facts and for an adequate consideration; and
separation, in this connection, is not required.3 "If there was any doubt
before on this subject, it was definitely settled by the Act of June 8, 1893".4
The courts have not always been careful in distinguishing between the
two types of agreements, which are very different both in subject matter
and in legal effects and results. The fundamental distinction is well stated
in the following excerpt from the case of Ray's Estate:- "'A distinction
exists between a simple separation settlement or postnuptial property settle-
ment making a division and allotment of property and property interests
between the parties. The question whether a deed is a separation deed or
a postnuptial settlement depends on the intention of the parties to be
gathered from the terms of the deed." The subject matter of a separation
agreement is usually provision for support of the wife during separation
and its terms are necessarily executory; whereas, the subject matter of a
postnuptial property settlement is property itself and just as necessarily
executed. The importance of these distinctions will be seen when the specific
cases on the termination of these agreements are examined.
Postnuptial property settlements do not have to be drawn up in con-
templation of a divorce or even of separation and are (inal, once they have
been fully executed,-that is, they are not terminated by the adultery or re-
marriage of the wife; and this type of contract can only be rescinded by
an express agreement to that effect.6
In separation agreements any express statement or stipulation in regard
to terminating such agreement is controlling, the intention of the parties
governing in this as in other contracts. The trouble lies, however, with
separation agreements which do not contain express stipulations in regard
to their termination and which, in the last analysis, resolve themselves into
problems of interpretation. It is purely a question of the intention of the
parties as gathered from the deed of separation as a whole. The most
difficult problem is whether the reconciliation of the parties annuls or abrogates
gHintner's Appeal, 54 Pa. 110; Singer's Estate, 233 Pa. 55; Scott's Estate, 147 Pa. 102.
4RaTy's Estate, 304 Pa. 421.
5304 Pa. 421. This excerpt was in turn taken from 30 Corpus Juris 1058,. section 833.
*$d)6We$, VIM. Rd, 5th. q4. $eCtioc 218.
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the agreement. There is a nice statement of this situation in a Kansas case7 :-
"It is frequently said that reconciliation and resumption of the marital re-
lation will render a contract void. This is a loose and inaccurate statement
of a supposed rule. The truth and the law is, that having entered into a
valid separation agreement, the courts cannot and will not deem such
contract avoided unless the conduct of the parties impels to the conclusion
that they themselves so regard it". The subsequent cohabitation of the parties
is evidence of an intention to abandon the agreement. "It is not subsequent
cohabitation alone which avoids such agreements, but the intentional renun-
ciation of them, which the resumption of marital relations sometimes evi-
dences. So far as subsequent cohabitation establishes such an intention and
so far only does it have the effect of avoiding the contract." s Where there
is doubt as to the intention of the parties, the reasonableness of abrogation
may control,-that is, in such cases, the court will examine the surround-
ing circumstances in order to throw light on the question of whether or
not abrogation was intended.' In some jurisdictions, reconciliation and re-
sumption of the marital relation operate automatically to abrogate the
agreement either because public policy discourages separation agreements
or because the consideration has failed.10 It would seem, however, that
the public policy argument in this connection is very weak; and be that
as it may, it is certainly not the law of Pennsylvania, for the courts do
not even mention the public policy angle. It w.s said in Singer's Estate11
that if the reconciliation is accompanied by an understanding that the
agreement is to continue in force, such understanding, though oral, will
control.
What constitutes such reconciliation as will abrogate a separation
agreement? There is an answer to this question in the New York case
of Re Smith,1 2 quoting from the opinion :-"The rule of law is well settled
that separation agreements for the support of the wife are, unless a contrary intent
is shown, annulled by any subsequent cohabitation between husband and
wife, even though such cohabitation be for ever so short a time, provided
that, when such cohabitation takes place, it was their intention to resume
permanently the marital relation .. ...... and it being clear that the
marital relation was resumed, the presumption is that permanency was intended".
Dennis v. Perkins, 129 Pac. 165, 88 Kan. 428 (1913). See also DLmielst v. Benedict,
97 Fed. 367; Hintner's Appeal, 54 Pa. 110.
Ray's Estate, 304 Pa. 421.
9Dennis v. Perkins, 88 Kan. 428 at page 434.
loSargent v. Sargent, 39 Par. 931 (Calif.); WelLs v. Stout, 9 Cal. 479.
11233 Pa. 55.
1236 N. Y. Supp. 820.
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If. an. agreement between husband and wife providing for their sepa-
ration goes beyond the terms of a mere separation deed, and is in effect
a good voluntary settlement by the husband on his wife, a subsequent recon-
ciliation between the parties cannot affect the agreement so far as it con-
stitutes a settlement, and hence the settlement must stand notwithstanding
the reconciliation. 13 This suggests another distinction between the executed
and executory provisions of a separation agreement. This is well stated in
Henkel's Estate,14. where the court says that a reconciliation between husband
and wife abrogates the covenants of an agreement of separation only so far
as the agreement has not been executed, and those provisions which have
been carried out are final and cannot be abrogated. It is an absolute mis-
statement, however, to say that reconciliation revokes any terms of a sepa-
ration agreement, inasmuch as 'it is the intention of the parties and not the
reconciliation of the husband and wife which is the important element.
There are also the added problems of adultery, divorce, and remarriage
of the wife to be considered. It is needless to say that the misconduct of
the husband does not abrogate any agreement between himself and his
wife. But the misbehaviour of the wife presents a different problem. The
law is settled that a separation agreement will not be abrogated by the
mere fact of the wife's adultery. 15 The same is. true as to a divorce and
subsequent re-marriage of the wife. This is not, however, a very frequent
difficulty inasmuch as there is usually included in the agreement a du
casta clause, which takes care of these contingencies. This rule is not a
hardship on the husband because if he desired to make the chastity of his
wife a condition to the continuance of the agreement he might have inserted
a dum casta" clause. As aptly stated in - Muhr's Estate'6 :-The agreement
of separation was not for the preservation of the marriage relation but its
very purpose was the getting rid of certain incidents of matrimony. Her
adultery in no way diminished the benefits he obtained by reason of the
agreement".
There is a question, voiced by at least one writer, as to whether a
divorce on some grounds other than adultery will come within a dum casta
clause and abrogate the agreement. It would seem that it would not, as the
clause itself' implies and provides for only adultery or subsequent re-
marriage
18Baird v. Connell, 121 Iowa 278, 96 N.W. 863.
1459 Pa. Super. Ct. 6353.
25Muhr's Estate, 59 Pa. Super. Ct. 393; Dixon--v. Dixon 24 N.J. Eq. 133; 30 Corpu
Juris 1065. section 846.
1 59 Pa. Super. Ct. 393.
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The death of the husband, in the absence of any express stipulation to
the contrary, will not affect the provisions of a separation agreement.11 In
such cases, according to a New York court, the widow has an election be-
tween taking her intestate share and continuing with the terms of the
agreement, the election of one of which precludes recourse to the other. 18
Again, however, this is not a very frequent difficulty, inasmuch as this con-
tingency is usually foreseen and expressly provided for in the agreement.
Before summarizing the conclusions on this subject, it would be well to
repeat that there are not many Pennsylvania authorities on the issues here
treated; but the points submitted below would very probably be the law of
Pennsylvania as gathered from some express decisions and dicta running
through all of the cases on this subject. From this review, the following
conclusions may be drawn:-
1. Both separation agreements, made in contemplation of an immedi-
ate or an inevitable separation, and postnuptial property settlements, when
the wife is aware of all the facts and there is no fraud, force, or coercion
practiced upon her, are valid and binding in Pennsylvania and are not
contrary to public policy.
2. There is an important distinction between a separation agreement,
the terms of which are mainly executory, and a postnuptial property settle-
ment, the terms of which are executed. This is important in that reconcil-
iation of the parties may abrogate the former; whereas, it will never serve
to annul the latter type of agreement without an express subsequent agree-
Ment to that effect. This distinction is too little noticed and applied by the
courts.
3. The effect of reconciliation on a separation agreement being a
matter of intention, an express stipulation in the agreement is of course
controlling.
4. Reconciliation, if the intention is to resume permanently the
marital relation, will annul those and only those terms of an executory
nature which provide for living apart, and this only if no contrary intent
is shown in the instrument. Reconciliation, without more, will never annul
a property settlement.
5. The adultery or divorce and remarriage of the wife will not auto-
matically annul an agreement for separation. This is not a practical difficulty,
however, inasmuch as a dum casta clause is usually inserted. The death
l 7 McVay's Estate, 260 Pa. 83; Bars ,. Kug et. a., 113 N.Y. Sp, 325.
181M re Junp, 212 N. Y. SUN. 119.
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of the husband does not abrogate separation agreements unless there is an
express provision to that effect.
6. Finally and most important, the termination of such agreements is
a question not of automatic revocation but of the intention of the parties
as gathered from the deed of separation as a whole and other circumstances.
John D. Glase
ASSIGNABILITY OF EASEMENTS IN GROSS IN PENNSYLVANIA
I
INTRODUCTION
The common theory in regard to easements in gross is that they are mere
personal interests in the land of another; that they are pzrsonal to the grantee
because not appurtenant to other premises; and that because of their personal
character are not assignable or inheritable, nor can they be made so by any
terms o1 the grant.' The last clause, "nor can they be made so by any terms
of the grant" is alleged by Professor Simes2 to have been a personal contri-
bution of Professor Washburne to the law of easements in gross. The latter
assumes, however, to rely on a statement of Sir William Blackstone as his
authority.3  In discussing ways as incorporeal hereditaments, the commentator
sa'd: "This may be grounded on a special privilege; as where the owner of
land g:ants to another a liberty of passing over his grounds, to go to church,
to market, or the like; in which case the gift or grant is particular, and
confined to the grantee alone; it dies with the person; and if the grantee
1Boatman v. Lasley (leading case) 23 Ohio State 614, (1873); 9 Ruling Case
Law 739; 19 Corpus Juris 867; Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Koelle, 104 Ill. 455, (1882);
Washbune on Easements, 4th ed., 11, 45; Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 38,
(1869); Lindenmuth v. Safe Harbor W.P. Corp., 309 Pa. 58, (1932); Weekly v. Wild.
man, 1 Ld. Raym. 405 at p. 407, (1698); 14 L.R.A. 333, (excellent note on assign-
ability of easements in gross); Stockdale v. Yerden, 220 Mich. 444, 448, 190 N.W.
225, 226, (1922) quoting 9 R.C.L. 739. Cf. also Thomas v. Brooks, 188 Ky. 253, 221
S.W. 542, (1920); 30 Yale Law Journal 94; Atlantic Mills v. N.Y.C4 Railroad, 221
App. Div. 386, 223 N.Y. Supp. 206 (3rd Dept.), (1927); Waller v. Kildebrecht,
295 111. 116, 122, 128 N. E. 807, 809 (1920); Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280
Pa. 104, 124 Ad. 351, 40 A.L,R. 1516 (1924); Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R. 1. 495,
23 At. 20, (1891).
2
Simes, "The Assignability of Easements in Gross in AmErican Law," 22 Mich.
LR. at 536, (1924).
SBlackstone's Com., Bk. II. 35.
